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Dedication

To my family, my friends, my partner, and my City.

“Chère Nouvelle Orléans, patrie de ma jeunesse, berceau de quelques-uns
de mes ancestres, tombeau d’un grand nombre de ceux que j’ai aimés. Je
demande à Dieu de te protéger, de te garder, de te bénir”
-

Hélène D’Aquin Allain (1868)

(“Dear New Orleans, home of my youth, cradle of many ancestors, tomb of
many I have loved. I ask of God to protect, to preserve and to bless thee”)
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Abstract
On August 29, 2005 the most destructive natural disaster to ever
befall the United States made landfall initially near Buras, Louisiana and
then ultimately near the mouth of the Pearl River. The associated storm
surge caused New Orleans’ protective levee system to fail, inundating the
City with brackish floodwaters for weeks on end. This was not the first
time the City of New Orleans was crippled by disaster. In 1788 and 1794,
the city suffered two major fires; the first burning 856 buildings and the
second 212. These were significant losses in a city that had a building stock
of approximately 1,000 buildings before the events. By recognizing the
lessons learned in the earlier reconstructions of New Orleans, we can gain a
better understanding of the rebuilding process that may forever effect the
physical and cultural environments in the City of New Orleans.

viii

Chapter I
Introduction
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, much has been said about the
potential for resilience in the City of New Orleans. It is important to note
that since it was founded in 1718, the City has faced large scale disasters
and emerged from them to steadily grow and develop intoa bustling
metropolitan area, becoming the New Orleans of myth and legend. This
thesis will examine the Great Fires of 1788 and 1794, both of which
consumed vast areas of New Orleans; in comparison with the events of
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the events and recovery of
the eighteenth century fires and to examine the lessons that can be learned
for the Post-Katrina rebuilding of New Orleans. While it is impossible to
directly compare the lessons learned or the disasters, the primary intent is
to show general trends that occurred in the rebuilding of the City in the
eighteenth century and how those trends can inform those currently faced
with recovery challenges in the City of New Orleans.
There are numerous parallels between the disastrous fires of 1788
and 1794 and Hurricane Katrina. Among these being the methods of
governmental response and the shifting footprint of the city, or at least the
potential for shifting. Beyond these similarities are the actual scenarios
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that were presented to the populace in the days, weeks and months
following the occurrence of the disasters.
The first portion of this document recounts the fires of the late
eighteenth century; the physical destruction, the response of the
government, and the patterns of redevelopment in New Orleans’ Vieux
Carré and the development of the surrounding area. This is followed by a
look at the significance of the disasters on the development of the city, both
culturally and physically. Finally, I will compare the effects of the fires of
1788 and 1794 on the initial development of New Orleans and the
rebuilding thereafter, to the catastrophic events of Hurricane Katrina and
the subsequent recovery and rebuilding of a Great American City at the
dawn of the twenty-first century.
Much of this document is dedicated to providing the history of New
Orleans, specifically the events surrounding the fires and the response of
the city leaders in the aftermath. Through the many histories of New
Orleans that have been produced over the years, there has not been much
attention paid to these catastrophic events that occurred only seventy years
after the establishment of the city. The Fire of 1788 has received more
attention in history, but the Fire of 1794 is generally either grouped with
the first fire or only mentioned in passing. One goal of this thesis is to give
attention to these disasters, and to explore how the lessons learned from
fire can parallel the lessons that should be learned from flood.
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Of the many histories of New Orleans that were reviewed in
preparation for this project, the most extensive coverage was provided by
Henry Castellanos’ New Orleans As It Was, and this coverage consisted of
the inclusion of the letter Governor Miro wrote to the King of Spain in the
immediate aftermath of the Fire of 1788 to demonstrate the immense need
of the colony’s inhabitants.
The key source of investigating the governmental response to these
disasters was found in the records of the Cabildo, which was the governing
council in New Orleans under the Spanish regime. These records served as
the ‘minutes’ of the Cabildo meetings, and the official record of what was
happening in the colony. The benefit of finding this primary source
information was that it revealed the actions of the Cabildo, recorded for
posterity, and the correspondence between the colony and officials of the
Crown, all entered into this official record. This allowed the researcher to
not only gain a better understanding of the Cabildo, but also the limitations
that the officials of New Orleans were faced with. These records were
translated from the original Spanish by the Works Progress Administration
in 1939.
Hurricane Katrina ravaged New Orleans on August 29, 2006 just
over a year before the final preparation of this document. With that being
said, there is very little literature available relating to governmental
response, other than the reports prepared by the government itself. Also,
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history has not had a chance to truly see the implications of decisions that
were made, and continue to be made that will forever steer the course of
the City of New Orleans. Statements made relating to the current state of
affairs in New Orleans come from these governmental sources, as well as
from the personal experience of living in Post-Katrina New Orleans.
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Chapter II
The Fire of 1788
The date was March 21, 1788; in the private chapel of colonial
treasurer Don Vicente José Nunez. His residence, at the corner of
Toulouse Street and Chartres Street (then Conde Street) became the
epicenter of the destruction that was to ensue. The fire began at 1:30 pm,
when an unattended candle fell into the lace dressings on his altar. Within
five hours, eight hundred fifty-six (856) buildings were destroyed in a
colonial city that was comprised of approximately 1,000 buildings on
March 20, 1788 (Castellanos, 238; King, 129).
While it has been determined that the fire started because of the
carelessness of one individual, the destruction is primarily attributed to
ceaseless southerly-to-southeasterly wind. According to the official
account of the fire by Governor Miro “a wind from the south, then blowing
with fury, thwarted every effort to arrest [the fire’s] progress” (Castellanos,
238). At the time of the fire, the City government had in its possession two
water pumps to be used for combating fire, and six grappling hooks. The
two pumps were destroyed by the fire, and the six grappling hooks were
not found among the debris (Cabildo, 21). During this period, contrary to
popular belief, the buildings and residences in New Orleans were not built
within close proximity to one another. The expeditious spreading of the
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fire can be attributed to the gale-force winds and wooden construction
(O’Connor, 32-33).
Approximately eighty percent (80%) of the colonial city had been
reduced to ashes in a matter of hours. Among the structures lost were the
parochial church, the presbytery, municipal buildings, military barracks
and the public jail. The Ursuline Convent, Royal Hospital, Custom House
and the Governor’s building were among those saved from the fire. The
buildings that survived the blaze did so more by a matter of positioning
than through any active fire-fighting efforts of the population. Those
structures along the levee and to the west of Conti Street were out of the
path of the wind-blown flames that consumed the rest of the colony
(Castellanos, 238-9; O’Connor, 33). Also destroyed in the blaze were
twenty-one bridges in various locations throughout the city (Cabildo, 29).
As part of the letter sent by Governor Miro to the King of Spain,
there was a rough illustration of the fires destruction. Figure 2.1 shows a
refined version of that map which was dispatched to the King of Spain.
The darker squares represent those areas that had been developed with
structures built upon them. The lighter shaded squares are areas that had
not been developed but were included in Pauger’s original plan for the City.
This illustration better represents the extent of the destruction wrought by
this fire than words describing the boundaries. While the destruction was
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limited to roughly half of the area of the City, eighty percent (80%) of the
settled area was destroyed (Castellanos, 241).
Figure 2.1: Plan showing the boundaries of the great Conflagration of New Orleans on
the 21st of March, 1788.

Source: The Historic New Orleans Collection

Amazingly, no lives were lost in the fire. The Gazette des Deux-Ponts
printed a first hand account of the fire in August of 1798, in which the
devastation of the fire was described as “an affliction so cruel and so
general, the only thing that can diminish out grief, is that not a man
perished” (King, 129).
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Response to the Fire of 1788
On the evening of March 21, 1788, as the flames subsided, the work
of recovery and aid began. Governor Miro related his relief efforts to His
Majesty, the King of Spain Charles III (Carlos III, Rey de España). In his
detailed account of the disaster he states:
To alleviate in part their immediate wants, camping tents were
distributed to those who applied for them and we agreed to
distribute daily one ration of rice, on your Majesty’s account,
to every one, without distinction, who solicited the same. The
number of these persons amounts to 700 who will continue to
be provided for during the continuance of their extreme
necessities (Castellanos, 241-2).
Governor Miro goes on to report that those families whose homes were not
destroyed by the fire had taken it upon themselves to house family and
friends that were left homeless. Between these acts of compassion and the
provisions supplied by the Royal Government, there was not one person
left without shelter in the aftermath of the blaze (Castellanos, 242).
The next action taken by the Governor was to dispatch three ships to
Philadelphia. The Governor withdrew 24,000 pesos from the Royal
Treasury in New Orleans in order to purchase supplies that would be
needed for the rebuilding of the City. Provisions, nails, medicines and
other “articles of first necessity” were to be purchased and brought back to
New Orleans as quickly as possible. Also ordered from Philadelphia were
3,000 barrels of flour, to ensure that famine would not follow the fire
(Castellanos, 242).

8

Governmental Response
In the days following the disastrous fire of 1788, the residents began
to rebuild their once-thriving community. The Cablido, which was
essentially the city council of the Colony, gathered for the first time after
the disaster on March 26, 1788, at the home of Governor Miro. During this
meeting, two urgent matters were considered by the council. First, the
Cabildo approved the continuation of providing rations to those left
homeless and hungry by the disaster. The items to be provided to families
were expanded to include the necessary materials for building a small
“cottage of pickets” in order to get people out of tents and back into somesort of home. The third aspect of this same piece of legislation was the
appointment of two members of the Cabildo to canvas the city to assess the
needs of the citizens that remained encamped around the city. The Cabildo
members selected for this task were Don Francisco Pascalis de la Barre and
Don Juan Arnoul (Cabildo, 13 - 14).
The second item of business addressed in this extraordinary session
of the Cabildo was the public jail. The jail was burned extensively in the
fire, and being that a jail is vital to the public safety, the Cabildo elected to
place the Chief-Constable in charge of the repairs to the facility, and
allowed him to make use of the City Funds, just over 7,000 pesos, to
resolve this dilemma. The Cabildo elected two of its own members to
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inspect the repairs made to the facility; Don Carlos de Reggio and Don
Rodolfo Joseph Ducros were selected for this purpose (Cabildo, 14).
The following day, March 27, 1788, the Cabildo again convened to
forward the resolutions of the previous day to the Intendant General of the
Province without waiting for a list of those in need to be attached. It was
felt that this would enable the government to act more quickly in aiding the
residents that were left homeless by the fire (Cabildo, 15).
The response by the Intendant General, dated March 27, 1788 and
ordered to be entered into the Cabildo Archives agreed with the Cabildo’s
request to provide rations to the residents of the community for as long as
necessary, but declined to provide for the construction of barracks or
cottages to meet the housing needs of the residents. He entrusted the
Assistant Attorney General of the colony to investigate the best way for the
King to aid in the recovery and rebuilding of the community (Cabildo, 17).
Assistant Attorney General Juan Bienvenu submitted his report to
the Cabildo on April 3, 1788; it was approved and entered into the record of
the Cabildo at their regular meeting on April 4. Three separate issues were
raised in the letter of Assistant Attorney General Bienvenu: 1)
reestablishment of commerce; 2) rebuilding loans; 3) scarcity of money.
The Assistant Attorney General, realized that the City’s merchants
losses would compound the losses to the City by limiting the amount of
goods available for sale, and in some cases making necessary items
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impossible to purchase; to reconcile this situation he proposed opening up
trade in the Gulf of Mexico to ships of other nations in order to ensure that
the supply of goods required to rebuild the community would be available.
The current practice of the Spanish Empire was to prohibit ships sailing
under any flag but that of Spain from entering the waters of the Gulf. The
merchants of New Orleans requested that they alone be allowed by the
Spanish government to enter into any port to import goods into the colony;
however, the farmers, and other non-merchants saw this as a way for the
merchant class of the city to control all commerce within the Colony.
Rather than allowing merchants to travel to any port and purchase goods
for resale in New Orleans, the Assistant Attorney General proposed to open
the waters of the Gulf of Mexico to the ships of other nations for a period of
ten (10) years. Under this proposal, these foreign vessels would have to
raise the Spanish flag and pay the six percent (6%) Custom House Duty
imposed in New Orleans (Cabildo, 18-19).
With the Intendant General of the Province not willing to provide for
the construction of cottages or barracks for the homeless of New Orleans, it
was proposed that the Crown provide rebuilding loans to those families left
destitute. The loan would be issued in proportion to what would be
required to rebuild their homes and provide for clothing and other
necessities. The loans would be backed by using the homes to be
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constructed as a guarantee against default, and would be repaid within ten
(10) years (Cabildo, 19).
The scarcity of money was not caused by the fire specifically, but was
certainly magnified by it. Due to Spain’s wartime monetary needs, regular
currency had been replaced by credit certificates. These certificates and
the bank notes that followed them caused prices for goods in the City to
increase due to the exchange costs of doing business with these documents.
It was requested that His Majesty remove from commerce the credit
certificates and bank notes, and replace them with numerary currency to
reenergize the local economy (Cabildo, 20).
At the Cabildo meeting of July 4, 1788, discussion turned to the
construction of a new Cabildo building, as the previous one was destroyed
in the fire. It was decided that the City would seek royal permission to
place their new government building on the public square at the center of
town, with a Public Market on the first floor, and the government
chambers above. The Cabildo elected the Royal Ensign, Don Carlos de
Reggio and the Chief Constable, Don Francisco Pascalis de la Barre to draft
plans which would reflect the request, for His Majesty’s consideration
(Cabildo, 31).
Once the government building (The Cabildo) was constructed at the
public square, Governor Miro proceeded to address the issue of the
damaged public jail. He ordered that a “calaboza” be constructed behind
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the Cabildo. Grace King describes the calaboza as “a grim two-story
construction surrounded by walls of massive thickness, and filled with little
cells and dungeons…” (King, 135). Near this prison the military arsenal of
the city was rebuilt (King, 135).
The next significant building to appear was a hotel for the Governor
of the province, this was placed at the corner of Toulouse Street and the
levee. In the place of the small wooden cottages that had once served as
the homes of the City’s residents, grand Spanish style soon emerged. Brick
and stucco replaced wood, and iron-work, balconies and galleries became
commonplace. This became the style of the day; however, some structures
were rebuilt more in the form of their pre-fire ancestors (King, 136).

Fire Protection
When the Cabildo convened on April 18, 1788, the issue of fire
protection was at the top of the agenda. The council unanimously agreed
to ask Governor Miro to write a letter to the Captain General of the
Province, Senor Don Joseph de Espleta, to request the delivery of four
pumps to be used in fighting another fire. It was agreed that these pumps
would be the best defense for the city in the case of another conflagration
such as the one that had occurred three weeks prior. In the same session, it
was decided that the City should have sixty leather buckets made, for the
purpose of extinguishing a fire (Cabildo, 21). Also ordered for the purpose
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of protecting the community from another disastrous fire were “two hooks
with a chain attached to each about fifteen feet long and its corresponding
rope, and six hooks with long wooden handles” (Cabildo, 21).
When the Cabildo convened on May 9, 1788, one of their first acts
that day was to purchase a new bell to be placed in the Government House,
to alert the citizens of emergencies or other important events. The fire,
which took place on March 21, 1788, is also known as the Good Friday fire;
in keeping with Catholic tradition, church bells must remain silent on that
day. It so happened that the bell in the Government building was out of
commission, which left no bells that could be sounded to alert the residents
of the City to the fire (King, 130). It is for this reason that the Cabildo
found it necessary to expedite the purchase and installation of a new bell
(Baron, 287).
Governor Miro was replaced by Governor Carondelet in 1791; the
first time fire prevention is explicitly mentioned in the records of the
Cabildo is 1792. At this time, the Spanish Colonial Government provided
for not only fire buckets to be made available, but also provided fire
engines and divided the city into four “wards.” Once the city was divided,
there was a police commissioner that was made responsible for taking
command of the fire engines and organizing fire protection (O’Connor, 36
– 7).
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Private Initiative
The most significant aid in rebuilding came from the benevolence of
Don Andres Almonaster y Rojas. Almost immediately after the fire
devastated the City of New Orleans, Almonaster came forward with an
offer to rebuild the City’s school house. This school was the first public
school in New Orleans, originally established in 1772 to teach Spanish.
After the successful completion of the school house, Almonaster decided to
undertake many other civic rebuilding projects to expedite the recovery of
the community.
The second project Almonaster offered to fund was the
reconstruction of the parish church. This project was completed at a cost
of $50,000. Almonaster went on to replace the old charity hospital with a
$114,000 structure that was named “Charity Hospital of St. Charles” in
honor of His Majesty, the King of Spain. His civil works projects went on
to include the construction of a “convent for the Capuchins” (The
Presbytere) and a town hall (The Cabildo). He also added a chapel to the
Ursuline convent (King, 132 – 3).
Following the devastation of 1788, the residents of New Orleans
began to look for an area to start expanding their City. It was at this time
that Bernard Gravier gained control of a portion of land that bordered on
the Colonial City. This area, originally named Ville Gravier was located just
upstream from the original city, and after the fire of 1788 this land was
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divided into lots and sold. He was aided in these efforts by Don Carlos
Laveau Trudeau, a Spanish Royal surveyor. This new suburb, or Faubourg,
became the first area into which the traditional city of New Orleans would
expand (McCaffety, 2002). After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803,
Americans began to populate this area of the City. This led the Faubourg
Ste. Marie, as Ville Gravier was renamed in honor of his wife’s Patron
Saint, to be known more commonly as the “American Sector” (Garvey, 80).
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Chapter III
The Fire of 1794
New Orleans was once again ravaged by flames in 1794. Despite the
preparation and efforts of the city government, this was another
uncontrollable blaze that left a large segment of the City totally destroyed.
On December 8, 1794 children were playing near a hay store on Royal
Street and accidentally caused a fire to start in that facility. The fire raged
for approximately three hours, and by the time it was extinguished, 212
structures had been burned (Garvey, 50). This fire was not nearly as
extensive as the Fire of 1788, but nonetheless several thousand people were
left homeless (Castellanos, 311).
One may ask why, after the Fire of 1788 the City was not better
prepared to fight another conflagration; the answer to that lies in training.
The new fire-fighting equipment and pumps purchased after the Fire of
1788 were in fact, utilized during this catastrophe, but due to insufficient
training with the equipment, the efforts of the firefighters were futile. The
fire-fighting pumps of that era were difficult to operate, and having not had
the ability to gain experience with large fires, the firemen were learning as
they worked. The firemen and the commissioners in charge made a valiant
effort to control the fire, but circumstance worked against them, and again
the City was left with a large tract of ashes (O’Connor, 37).
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The map in Figure 4.1, drawn by Georgia B. Drennau in 1941, as part
of the Historic American Building Survey in Louisiana, shows the outline of
the fire that consumed much of the City. The details of this map were
drawn from the letter of Governor Carondelet to the King of Spain. The
wind was blowing from the north to northeast, and contributed greatly to
the rapid spreading of the fire. This was similar to Governor Miro’s
account of the Fire of 1788, described in Chapter 2.
Figure 4.1: Sketch showing area covered by the Great Fire, December 8, 1794.

Source: The Historic New Orleans Collection
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Response to the Fire of 1794
It was after the devastation that occurred in 1794 that the residents
of the city truly embraced the architectural changes that had been
encouraged after the fire of 1788. Homes would now be constructed of
brick with common firewalls between them. This produced the French
Quarter look that still exists today, and is known around the world (Reeves,
2006).

Governmental Response
Just as in 1788, one of the first issues regarding the fire that the
Cabildo officially addressed was the need to repair the Royal Jail. This was
first addressed during the meeting of the Cabildo on December 12, 1794.
The jail was not destroyed during the fire; therefore, only repairs were
needed to bring the facility back to a useful state (Cabildo, 177).
Two requests were made of the Cabildo at this time, by Juan Bautista
Labatut the Attorney General: 1) to tear down the straw huts that had been
built as emergency shelter after the fire of 1788 and 2) to have engineers
inspect those houses near the plaza that were built of combustible material
in order to prevent another large-scale fire from sweeping through the City
(Cablido, 178).
The straw huts to which the Attorney General was referring were
constructed as emergency housing for those left homeless by the Fire of
19

1788. These structures were built on the property of the Capuchin Fathers,
and were allowed to serve as temporary housing for up to two years
following the first fire. These huts were eventually sold to other persons,
and by 1794, none of those originally granted the special permits by the
Cabildo were residing in the small huts (Cabildo, 177 – 8).
These small huts, originally meant to serve as temporary housing,
were still present six years later, and were a cause of concern because
within a week of the Fire of 1794 one of these huts burned, and was in very
close proximity to the other huts of the same variety. It was feared that one
of these structures would be the cause of yet a third great fire. The Cabildo
agreed with the Attorney General, and ordered that these huts be
destroyed, after first giving the current tenants one month to find
alternative housing (Cabildo, 178).
The Attorney General’s second request was also granted. It was
ordered that the small houses built along the sides of the public plaza be
inspected for safety. These houses belonged to Don Andres Almonaster y
Rojas, a member of the Cabildo and prominent resident of the City. The
concern was raised regarding this property because the houses were built
of a combustible material and were located very close to one another. The
Cabildo agreed with the Attorney General’s assessment of the situation and
ordered that the houses be inspected and, if necessary, rebuilt in
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accordance with the recommendations made by the engineers (Cabildo,
178 – 9).
In a letter dated December 19, 1794 Attorney General Labatut
addresses the concerns of the residents of New Orleans to the Cabildo, and
asks, in turn, that these concerns and requests be forwarded to the King of
Spain. The requests made in this letter reflect those requests made of His
Majesty following the Fire of 1788. This letter requested the King provide
one million pesos in rebuilding loans, and that import duties be reduced to
six percent (Cabildo, 181 – 2).
The one million peso loan would be provided to citizens in order to
reconstruct their homes, and would be divided proportionally so that those
previously occupying larger homes would be able to rebuild their largerthan-average homes. By accepting the government loans to rebuild, the
residents would have to agree that their new homes would meet certain
criteria. The home, regardless of size, must be built of brick, and must be
topped with either a flat roof or a tile roof; these criteria were set in place in
attempt to reduce the risk of another fire sweeping through large sections
of the City (Cabildo, 181).
Just as was offered after the Fire of 1788, the loans provided by the
Crown for rebuilding would be guaranteed by the house built with the
money; however, this time, there was the additional guarantee of all of a
borrower’s assets, up to the amount of the loan. The mortgage would be
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offered on a ten-year term, but payment would not be required for the first
two years (Cabildo, 181).
The second request made in the Attorney General’s letter to the
Cabildo was that His Majesty allow the import duties collected in New
Orleans to be lowered to six percent. This was seen as a way to aid the
City’s recovery, while at the same time providing an incentive to commerce
that was sorely needed after the disaster. Many stores, shops and other
retail establishments were destroyed in the Fire of December 8, 1794, and
by allowing the lowering of import duties, the shopkeepers and merchants
would be more able to restock their businesses and provide the goods that
the residents of the City desperately needed and desired (Cabildo, 180 – 2).
The letter from the Attorney General of the Province was presented
to the Cabildo during their December 19, 1794 meeting. Upon reviewing
the document, the council voted unanimously to approve the document.
Approval by the Cabildo allowed the Colonial Governor of New Orleans to
forward the letter to the King of Spain in a direct appeal for aid (Cabildo,
182).

Fire Protection
In 1795, the Cabildo levied a Chimney Tax to pay for fire-fighting
equipment and the personnel to operate it. This tax provided
approximately 4,000 pesos a year in revenue to be used for protecting the
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City from future fires. This tax not only paid for fire protection, but also
fire prevention. This tax provided for master bricklayers to inspect
chimneys around the city, these men were paid two pesos a day for their
service to the City. A portion of this fund also provided gas lamps to be
placed around the City for added safety at night (Din, 96).
Around this same time, a type of fire insurance came into being.
Several volunteer fire brigades formed throughout the City and through
donations to their cause, building owners were given a particular mark to
display on their building. The display of this mark would provide
preferential fire protection to those persons able to afford the donation.
Preferential treatment was given during general fires only, if there were
one building burning, the brigade would report regardless of whether the
property displayed the mark. Unfortunately for those unable or unwilling
to make the required donation, most fires at that time were general fires,
and therefore the building displaying the mark would receive concentrated
fire-fighting efforts (Garvey, 56).
In 1804, the Council was presented with a report from a Fire
Committee with recommendations for improving fire protection
throughout the City. It was recommended that a foreman and a fire
company of fifteen men be attached to each of the four engines that were
placed in the City’s four wards. This report was presented to the Council
on April 7, 1804; by April 11, the appointed foremen of these fire
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companies presented the Council with lists of proposed company
members. The lists were accepted by the Council, and on that same day a
committee was formed for the sole purpose of honoring the requisitions of
the newly formed fire companies (O’Connor, 38).
Perhaps the most significant policy shift that came about after the
Fire of 1794 was that the Cabildo passed an ordinance requiring all
buildings over one story in height to be constructed of brick. This
requirement greatly influenced not only what materials were used in the
rebuilding of the City, but also the architectural style in which it was done.
Prior to the Fire of 1794, much of the architecture reflected the French
culture that predominated in the City. In the rebuilt City, “the wide and
shallow hipped roof, galleried townhouse perfected in the French period
gave way vertical, long and narrow Spanish-style townhomes, many with
overhangs, iron work and mezzanines” (Reeves, 2006). This brought to
New Orleans a look and feel that was distinctly more Spanish than French.
The effect that these new standards had on the City was to reflect the
Spanish holdings in the Caribbean, upon which much of the new
architecture was based (Garvey, 50).

Private Initiative
Just as the fire of 1788 spurred the development of Faubourg Ste.
Marie, the 1794 fire amplified the growth of the City. It was a combination
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of factors, fires of the Vieux Carré and increasing population, which caused
several new suburbs to arise around the historical core of New Orleans.
One of the first of these new suburbs was the Faubourg Marigny.
The area is named for Bernard Xavier Phillippe de Marigny de Mandeville
who, along with his guardian Solomon Prevost had the Marigny plantation,
located just downriver from the Vieux Carré divided into parcels and sold.
Marigny was considered a minor when he inherited his family’s fortune in
1803; therefore, any action taken regarding the property had to be
approved by his appointed guardian (Reynolds, 2005).
In order to be allowed to offer the parcels of his plantation for sale,
he first had to seek the approval of the City Council. Once this approval
was granted, the first lot in the newly created Faubourg Marigny was sold
in September 1805. By the end of the year, thirty more parcels had been
sold, and by 1811 over 150 households called this area home. The parcels
measured thirty feet by one hundred feet, on average; making it possible to
construct not only single family homes on these properties, but also
doubles (Reynolds, 2005)
Another area that began to rapidly develop in the late 1790’s to early
1800’s was the Faubourg Tremé. In 1794 the Carondelet Canal, which ran
through the plantation of Claude Tremé, was completed. This made the
land owned by Mr. Tremé very valuable as an industrial corridor. Some
residential development took place at this point, but it was not until the
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Girod Canal was completed in 1822 that Tremé was able to be completely
drained of water and allowed to develop. Once the land was cleared and
made ready for residential development, the City laid out the street pattern
in 1826. Within ten years of the street pattern being fixed, the Tremé
neighborhood was almost completely developed (City Planning
Commission, 1999).
At this time, the boundaries of New Orleans were also pushing
further upriver into what would be known as the Garden District and
Uptown. The development beyond Faubourg Ste. Marie officially began in
1806 when Madame Marguerite Delord-Sarpy decided to have surveyor
Barthelemy Lafon subdivide her plantation into parcels to be sold. Before
Lafon’s work was done, Madame Delord-Sarpy sold her property to
Armand Duplantier. Mr. Duplantier, with the help of Lafon created the
Faubourg Annonciation. This is the area that is commonly known now as
the Lower Garden District (Starr, 16).

Fire Prevention
Having learned the valuable lessons of the fires of 1788 and 1794, the
City Council of New Orleans passed an ordinance on January 31, 1807 that
laid out all city regulations regarding fire prevention. This ordinance was
commonly known as the “Bucket Ordinance” because one of the key
regulations was that every home and business was to have at least two
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buckets to be used for fighting fires. The ordinance was comprised of three
titles: Title I: Precautions against Fires; Title II: Firemen and Sapeurs; Title
III: Aid in Case of Fire (O’Connor, 39 – 43).
Title I of the ordinance required that a number of conditions be met
by the residents of New Orleans. The provision of buckets was chief among
them; all homes and businesses were required to have two fire buckets on
their premises at all times, and also required that those buckets be
suspended in “a conspicuous place.” Landlords were to provide tenants
with their buckets, and when vacating a property, if the buckets were not
returned to the landlord in good condition, the tenant would have to
replace them. This ordinance also provided that if buckets were not
obtained by a homeowner within six months, the City would provide
buckets to the homeowner at cost. One other aspect of Title I applied to all
residents of New Orleans and the Faubourgs. There was to be a well dug
on every property in the city. The minimum dimensions of the wells were
to be at least ten feet deep and four feet in diameter (O’Connor, 40).
The ordinance went on to detail where the City’s fire engines were to
be housed and what other fire fighting equipment would be kept with
them. Four engines were to be housed at City Hall along with various and
sundry other equipment. A large sign was to be placed on the peristyle of
City Hall that read “Dépôt des Pompes” in both English and French. The
rest of the City’s fire engines were to be placed at various locations around
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the City. One would be placed in each quarter of the city, one in the
Faubourg Ste. Marie, and one in the play-house. Again, these locations
would also be used to store fire-fighting equipment, such as ladders and
hooks that would be useful in saving the City from another disaster. Each
of these locations was to be labeled with a sign similar to the one at City
Hall, so that all residents would know where to find the appropriate
equipment in the case of a fire (O’Connor, 42 – 3).
Title II effectively created the first Fire Department in New Orleans.
The City Council ordered that companies of firemen be attached to each of
the pumps in the city. A foreman and an assistant foreman would be
provided for each company; each large pump would receive an additional
eighteen firemen and the smaller pumps would each receive ten. All
companies were to be administered by a Captain and two Lieutenants,
these men would remain in touch with City Hall and would provide the
City’s instructions to the foreman of each company. Title II also provided
for the services of “sapeurs.” By the duties listed in the ordinance, these
sapuers would be workmen “accustomed to use the axe, such as carpenters,
joiners, wheelwrights, blacksmiths and ironworkers” (O’Connor, 43).
These men would be appointed by the mayor, and would serve when
needed by the fire companies (O’Connor, 43).
Title III details the actions that are to be expected of the City officials
and the residents in case a fire were to occur. Residents were expected to
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shout “Fire!” and report to City Hall to report the incident. By reporting to
City Hall, the guard on duty would ring the bell to summon fire fighters
and city officials to City Hall or another designated location, such as an
engine house. To be sure that someone of authority is present in the case
of a fire, the mayor appointed a “Commissaire annuel” for each district in
the City and each of the faubourgs. This man would possess the authority
of the Mayor, if the mayor were to be absent in an emergency. If the Mayor
were present, the Commissaire would assist him in matters directly
affecting that district. It was also provided in Title III that to encourage the
expeditious service of the fire companies, the City would award fifty dollars
to the first company to arrive with its engine at the scene of a fire
(O’Connor, 43 – 4).
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Chapter IV
The Significance of Disaster
New Orleans on the Rebound
The resilience of New Orleans, as a place and as an idea is amazing.
Vale and Campanella’s (2005) recent book entitled “The Resilient City”
chronicles the destruction and reconstruction of a number or World Cities.
It is noted that between the years of 1100 and 1800 only forty-two cities
were abandoned entirely because of disaster (Ibid, 3). The vast majority of
cities is rebuilt and generally emerges from disaster in a better situation
than before. American cities have shown amazing resilience in the past
230 years, San Francisco, Chicago and Washington were all severely
burned; Galveston was nearly obliterated by a hurricane and numerous
communities across the nation have been ravaged by their own unique
series of events. What makes New Orleans stand out in this crowd? This is
of great interest today and the question has been asked: is there only so
much resilience that one city can muster (Vale, 3)?
Within the relatively short lifespan of the City of New Orleans, the
city has endured numerous disasters that have left the City in the unique
and undesirable position of debating the merits of reconstruction. Two of
the most significant were, arguably, the fires of the late eighteenth century.
Perhaps it is because these events were not truly natural disasters, but man
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made. There is no evidence showing a debate over the rebuilding of New
Orleans after the large scale destruction seen in 1788 and 1794. The
residents picked up the pieces of their city and their lives and strived to
make New Orleans a better place than it had been before.
At this point in the development of New Orleans, the involvement of
the national government was more direct than cities experience in the
present system of government. The person charged with the day-to-day
administration of the colony was the Royal Governor, appointed by the
King of Spain; this allowed for direct appeals to His Majesty in cases such
as fires that destroyed large portions of the city as was demonstrated by
Governor Miro in his post-fire letter to the King of Spain in 1788
(Castellanos, 238 – 44). The direct involvement of the Royal Government
in the affairs of the colony significantly aided the recovery of the City after
both fires. At the request of the Royal Governors of New Orleans, the
Royal Treasury made available loans to the colonists to help them rebuild
their lives. These loans, as was previously discussed, were very low interest
and allowed colonists to place the home they promised to build as
collateral (Cabildo, 19).
Also at issue at this time was the value of the Mississippi River to
trade, not only for the Spanish, but for French and American hunters and
traders. Prior to the fire of 1788, the Spanish decreed that any nonSpanish ship would have to obtain a permit from a Spanish official before
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entering the Mississippi River. Beyond that restriction, a complete
inventory of cargo and prices (for resale) would have to be provided to the
government. If the prices were deemed to be too high, the ship would not
be allowed to unload at New Orleans. The final restriction stated that
when the ship left the City, at least one third of out-going cargo had to be
products of the colony (Eakin, 138). After the fires, trade became less
restricted, but remained under the control of the Spanish authorities. Any
ship would now be allowed to enter into the Mississippi, provided that it
raise the flag of Spain and pay a six percent duty at port (Cabildo, 18-19).
The less restrictive trade policies put in place in the aftermath of the
fires aided the recovery of the city in two distinct ways: the rebuilding of
the economy and the rebuilding of lives. The economy would be bolstered
by this plan for two reasons. First, by allowing the ships of any nation to
sail to the Port of New Orleans, local merchants would have the ability to
restock the warehouses that had been reduced to ashes. This would,
therefore, allow merchants to reopen for business and provide the much
needed materials required for rebuilding an entire city (Cabildo, 18-19).
The second economic incentive that drove this plan forward was the
imposition of the six percent Custom House Duty to be paid by all ships
utilizing the port, this duty would allow for the Royal Treasury to recoup
the losses it suffered in the conflagration. An additional benefit of allowing
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ships to utilize the port was that this action was seen as a way to prevent
smuggling goods into the City from the Gulf of Mexico (Cabildo, 18-19).
The second reason for the implementation of this less restrictive
policy was to help the colonists rebuild their lives after the enormous
catastrophe. By opening the port to ships of other nations, colonists were
able to purchase clothing and rebuild their homes more expeditiously than
if only Spanish ships had to provide all materials. The Cabildo noted that
those suffering the greatest loss were the merchants, but at the same time
“a great many of [New Orleans’] inhabitants have been reduced to the most
miserable conditions” (Cabildo, 19).
The late nineteenth century proved not to be the worst time for such
a disaster to occur. It was just at this time that New Orleans started to
experience rapid growth; not only insofar as new colonists from Europe,
but also with people migrating from the newly established United States
and other European colonies in the “New World.” In 1788, the same year
as the first fire, the colonial government had conducted a survey, and it was
determined that the population of New Orleans was just over five-thousand
persons. The entire colonial province boasted a population of 42,611
(Saxon, 150).
Within twenty years of the first fire, New Orleans was completely
reshaped, not just in its built form, but also in the way in which it
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functioned. Lyle Saxon described the effects of the fires eloquently in his
book Fabulous New Orleans:
The city that fell before the flames was a congested French
community of wooden houses, badly arranged and irregular.
A stately Spanish city rose in its stead. … The City which rose
from its ashes was of brick and plaster, with arches of heavy
masonry and roofs of tile. There were barred windows and
long, dark corridors. Large fan-shaped windows looked down
into courtyards which held banana trees, oleanders, and
parterres of flowers. Houses were built flush with the
sidewalks; and balconies railed with delicate wrought iron,
overhung the streets (Saxon, 150).
The first settlement beyond the boundaries of the original city took
place in the aftermath of the Fire of 1788. Perhaps it was a fear of another
disaster, or perhaps it was simply a timely coincidence; but, what is known
is that immediately after the Fire of 1788, the shape of New Orleans was
forever changed. Once the Faubourg Ste. Marie was approved the
expedient growth of New Orleans began. Within a quarter century of the
first fire, New Orleans was the largest American City west of the
Appalachian Mountains, and was still growing. The population of New
Orleans in 1803 was estimated to be between 8,000 and 12,000 persons,
no more accurate estimates are available (Campbell 1921, 415). Regardless
of what the population was in 1803, there was a significant increase in
population in the first years of American Territorial government. In the
1810 United States Census, the first census conducted after the Louisiana
Purchase, New Orleans had a population of nearly 17,000 people (US
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Census Bureau, 2). To demonstrate the relative size of New Orleans to
other western American Cities, in 1810 the City of St. Louis had a
population of approximately 1,400 people (US Census Bureau, 2).
The growth of New Orleans in the late nineteenth century is, of
course, not attributable to the fires that ravaged the city. Rather, the City,
like many others across North America and the fledgling United States, was
experiencing rapid growth. It seems that the fires served as a starting point
in the physical growth and redevelopment of the area. As was articulated
in the quote by Lyle Saxon, New Orleans became a ‘modern’ city in the
wake of the fires. Since large tracts of land were cleared and required
rebuilding, this was the chance to ensure that development followed some
sort of standardized guidelines (Garvey 50 - 51).
The rapid resurrection of New Orleans from its ashes is due
primarily to the region’s rapid growth at that point in history. Americans
were beginning their westward expansion, and the Mississippi River would
play a key role in that expansion. By 1800, well over 250,000 immigrants,
farmers and explorers had left the confines of the new United States and
ventured into the Ohio and Kentucky Territories, and into Spanish
Louisiana. These adventurous pioneers relied heavily on the Mississippi
River for trade with both European colonies and the east coast cities of the
United States. It was a combination of this exploratory spirit and the
necessities of trade that brought thousands of new residents to
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southeastern Louisiana and New Orleans at the close of the eighteenth
century (Muzzy, 139 – 41).

The Significance for Posterity
A historical look at the City of New Orleans cannot be attempted
without a brief look at how the place came to be. In 1718 brothers Pierre Le
Moyne, Sieur de Iberville and Jean Baptiste Le Moyne, Sieur de Bienville
established the Colony of New Orleans at the present location of the Vieux
Carré. This was a location that was selected more for its strategic position
than its environment. The bend in the river gave the colony an advantage
in identifying vessels approaching the area from either direction (Garvey,
17-20). The colony remained French until it was ceded to Spain under the
Peace of Paris, signed in 1763, marking the ending of the Seven Years’ War
(Wall, 53).
It turned out that the great fires that ravaged the City gave the
Spanish their only opportunity to levy any influence on the development of
the city. The Spanish officially took control of the Colony in late 1765. His
Majesty appointed Antonio de Ulloa to serve as the governor of the
Louisiana territory. The Spanish regime only took control as far as titles
are concerned. The residents of New Orleans remained French throughout
the Spanish period (Wall, 55). Edwin Adams Davis remarked in his
History of Louisiana that “seldom in history has a dominant power been so
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lenient with colonials of another nationality, and seldom has a ruling
nationality been so completely dominated and assimilated by that held
under control” (Garvey, 41).
In the aftermath of the fires, the Cabildo enacted ordinances
regulating the building standards that created the relatively standard
outward appearance that is recognized as the “New Orleans French
Quarter” around the world. French Colonial architecture was wood-based,
and had already proved to be insufficient for ensuring public safety in the
community; this led to the importation of the Caribbean-Spanish style of
architecture that is the most readily apparent mark left by the Spanish on
Louisiana (Garvey, 42).
It was also at this time that the culture of the New Orleans area was
shifting from the traditional French that had persisted throughout the
Spanish period. . Interestingly, while under Spanish rule little Spanish
culture was injected into the New Orleans way-of-life. It was the massive
influx of Americans at this time and others migrating into the colony that
had the social; and cultural influences that we recognize today.
Although the Spanish controlled the City of New Orleans from 1765
until 1803, there is little Spanish culture that is present in the region. This
is primarily attributed to a difference in colonial practices between the
French and Spanish. When the French began to colonize New Orleans as a
city rather than a military outpost, the men would bring their wives and
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children to the colony, thus preserving their heritage. The Spanish,
however, only sent men into the colony for many years. These single men
would then marry into the Creole and French families and adopt the
culture and language more familiar to their new families (Garvey, 41).
The Americans, having adopted the concept of Manifest Destiny,
began flowing into the City during the 1790’s. The rate at which these
“foreigners” entered into the City is unknown; however, in 1801 Don Juan
Manuel de Salcedo, the last Spanish governor of Louisiana issued a decree
prohibiting Americans from receiving any land grants in the Colony. This
was seen as a way to dissuade the “designs of the Americans.” Salcedo also
suspended the right of deposit for American shipping, and refused to
designate another site where cargo could be placed (King, 153). These
actions were resented by the United States; it was felt that the Americans
had the right, by the law of nature, to utilize the Mississippi (King, 153 – 4).
Grace King’s New Orleans: The Place and The People contains an
unattributed quote that reflects the sentiments of the American nation:
The Mississippi is ours, by the law of nature. Our rivers swell
its volume and flow with it to the Gulf of Mexico. Its mouth is
the only issue which nature has given to our waters, and we
wish to use it for our vessels. No power in the world should
deprive us of our rights. If our liberty in this matter is
disputed, nothing shall prevent our taking possession of the
capital, and when we are once masters of it we shall know how
to maintain ourselves there. If Congress refuses us effectual
protection, we will adopt measures which our safety requires,
even if they endanger the peace of the Union and our
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connection with the other States. No protection, no allegiance
(King, 154).
The Americans in the Ohio Valley had begun to depend on the Mississippi
as a trade route after the acceptance of Pickney’s Treaty in 1795. It was this
treaty that secured the Right of Deposit for American shipping in New
Orleans. The treaty only secured the right for three years, but the right was
not rescinded until Governor Salcedo saw that the American influence in
the city was becoming too strong in 1802 (Wall, 80).
Unbeknownst to the Spanish Colonial authorities and the citizens,
New Orleans was ceded back to France on October 1, 1800 through the
Treaty of San Ildefonso. France would not formally take command of the
City for another three years. Following the Treaty, the United States
decided that in order to guarantee trade through the mouth of the
Mississippi, the City of New Orleans would have to be American. In 1803,
the United States purchased the entire Louisiana Territory from Napoleon,
including the Isle of Orleans (Wall, 80-3).
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Chapter V
Comparison to Katrina
The worst natural disaster in American History
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall initially near
Buras, Louisiana and proceeded across marshland and low-lying areas of
Louisiana to make final landfall near the mouth of the Pearl River (NOAA,
3). Although it came ashore as a Category 3 storm on the Saffir-Simpson
Hurricane Scale, Katrina is the costliest storm to ever strike the United
States, and is one of the five deadliest storms on record. Katrina is
regarded as “one of the most devastating natural disasters in United States
history” (NOAA, 1). Widespread destruction was suffered from
southeastern Louisiana to Florida’s panhandle; the most concentrated
damage was in Louisiana and on Mississippi’s Gulf Coast. (NOAA, 1)
Hurricane Katrina caused chaos and destruction everywhere in New
Orleans. The storm surge caused levees to fail throughout the City of New
Orleans, inundating the City with brackish waters, essentially making the
City an extension of Lake Pontchartrain. The failed levees caused extensive
flooding throughout eighty percent of the city. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are
satellite images of southeastern Louisiana; the top picture was taken on
August 30, 2005 the lower picture on August 27, 2005. The extent of the
flooding in New Orleans can clearly be seen in Figure 5.1 (NASA).
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2: A pair of images from the NASA Terra Satellite. Figure 5.1 shows the
massive flooding in New Orleans, taken August 30, 2005. Figure 5.2 shows how New
Orleans appears normally, taken August 27, 2005.
Figure 5.1

Figure 5.2

Source: The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
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Table 5.1

Disaster Comparisons and Contrasts
Fire

Flood
Comparison

80% of the built environment of New
Orleans was destroyed.

80% of New Orleans' land area was
innundated with brackish flood waters

Contrasts
The flooding was a byproduct of
The fires were spontaneous disasters
hurricane, which was a predictable
that caused the residents to relocate for
event causing large-scale evacuations in
the duration of the event.
preparation for the event.
The damage caused by the fires was
limited to the time of the event itself.
Allowing for rebuilding and relief
efforts to come online immediately.

The destruction following Hurricane
Katrina were caused by a series of
events and weeks of standing water,
preventing relief, recovery or rebuilding
efforts from beginning.

The population of New Orleans was
The population of New Orleans was
spread across the United States, thus
available to respond to the disaster and placing the full burden of clean-up on
to begin recovery operations as soon as the government and preventing citizens
disaster conditions ceased.
from participating in their own
recovery.

Parallels to Rebuilding in 1788 and 1794
There are numerous parallels between the great fires of 1788 and
1794 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the most obvious among them being
that in 1788 eighty percent (80%) of the city was consumed by flames and
in 2005 that same percentage of the city was consumed by water.
Governments have always had a responsibility to their citizens for
such things as defense in times of war and to ensure well being in times of
crisis. These obligations are made clear in governmental responses to
completely different disasters that span almost 220 years. Housing,
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sustenance and ability to rebuild are the primary factors that a victim of
disaster would likely be most concerned with. Secondary, and less
immediately pressing factors are how, where and what to rebuild.
There seems to be a standard series of responses that a government
sets into motion in the aftermath of disaster, the immediate needs of
housing and food are the first to be addressed. Soon thereafter, the
government must begin the process of helping people put their lives back
together.
On the night of March 21, 1788, within hours of the city being
decimated by a ferocious blaze, the military was busy distributing military
field tents to ensure that every resident of New Orleans had a roof over
their heads as night approached. Many of the citizens of the colony were
left with only the clothes on their backs, the royal governor understood his
obligation as the King’s representative in the colony; he was to ensure the
survival of the colonists and New Orleans itself (Castellanos, 241-2). In the
wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) began the task of ensuring that those most affected by the disaster
were taken care of. This included shelter, ranging from large public
shelters with hundreds of evacuees to individual hotel rooms for families
with nowhere else to go.
Unlike the immediate response offered by the Royal Government,
FEMA was not on the ground in the immediate aftermath of the event.
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This difference could be attributed to two distinct variations between the
events: the type of government and type of disaster. In 1788, the Royal
Government of the colony was an absolute power while the United States
has varying strata of governmental authority. The Spanish Administration
had the capability to utilize all resources under their control to ensure that
immediate needs were met; the complex nature of modern government has
caused government response time to slow dramatically. There is no
question that the sheer magnitude of Hurricane Katrina’s devestation
overwhelmed the government’s response capabilities; however, in the years
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States,
there has been a push to ready governments at all levels for a catastrophic
event. Four years of preparation and planning for disasters was tested, and
the end result demonstrated in the extreme events of the Louisiana
Superdome and Ernest Morial Convention Center in the days following
Hurricane Katrina where thousands of New Orleanians were left destitute
without such basic provisions as food and water.
As the City of New Orleans filled with storm surge, thousands of
American citizens were virtually abandoned by their government for days
while issues such as who has control and who has responsibility was
worked out. Rather than allowing the agency with the necessary resources
to evacuate the remaining residents of the City, the government bickered
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amongst themselves about who should be doing the work, instead of who
could.
The other distinct difference affecting the governmental response to
Katrina was the very nature of the disaster. Fires and floods have distinctly
different aftermaths; in the case of the Fires of 1788 and 1794, the disaster
struck with no warning, and the only way to remain safe was to get out of
the path of the spreading flames. This meant that while the city would
have been virtually empty during the event, the citizens and government of
the City would have returned as soon as the flames were extinguished. In
2005, vast swaths of the City were filled with brackish floodwaters for as
much as three weeks, inhibiting both the rescue effort and the importation
of relief goods.
As the City of New Orleans began to rebuild in the eighteenth
century, the Royal government saw that the economy of the area was
devastated. This meant that there would not only be no economic activity,
but also there would be no way for people to find the money to rebuild
their lives. In order to fund the reconstruction of the city, the Cabildo
requested an interest-free loan from the His Majesty that would place the
house that was to be rebuilt as collateral, since few in the colony had
anything left upon which they could leverage a loan. These loans would be
provided in relation to how much money would be necessary to rebuild a
home comparable to the one destroyed. While there are no records
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available that provide specific loan-qualifying details, the records of the
Cabildo indicate that this loan was specifically for “those who absolutely
lack the means and resources to do so” (Cabildo, 19). Today, this monetary
aid has been provided primarily by two federal agencies, the Small
Business Administration (SBA) and FEMA, as well as the newly formed
Road Home program created by the State of Louisiana to aid uninsured
and underinsured homeowners rebuild their lives and their communities.
In 1788 and 1794, the royal loans were provided to those most in
need after the conflagrations that consumed large swaths of the City of
New Orleans. The problem faced in the wake of Hurricane Katrina is how
to repeat that process. Under a myriad of federal regulations that have
been designed in a piecemeal fashion through the years, there are
qualifying conditions that must be met in order to receive a disaster
recovery loan through the SBA. Many of the areas most heavily impacted
by the hurricane were low-to-moderate income areas, where the residents
likely did not have flood insurance, nor do they possess the resources to
rebuild. Those fortunate enough to possess insurance have been
systematically receiving lower settlements that they are likely entitled to,
but due either a lack of awareness of settlement options or a long standing
distrust of government many African-Americans in the most heavily
damaged areas have not challenged the assessments of their insurers
(Callimachi, 2006). Another item that these people do not possess is the
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ability to meet the qualifying conditions set forth by the federal
government. This means that those actually benefiting from the SBA loan
program are those needing such assistance the least.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is another
agency tasked with helping to rebuild the lives of those affected by the
hurricane. The programs administered by FEMA are done so far more
liberally than those of the SBA, while this allows for those most in need to
get greater assistance, it also opens the door for fraud. In the immediate
wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA opened its coffers to the New Orleanians
spread throughout the fifty-states. Immediate disaster assistance grants
were made to virtually any applicant haling from a federally declared postal
code; there have also been housing allowances provided to allow for
‘temporary housing’ in either apartments or hotels. Under the Stafford Act
which governs the operations of FEMA, permanent housing solutions are
not allowed within the scope of FEMA’s mission. It has been well
established that fraud occurred on a mass scale following Hurricane
Katrina. It is estimated that tens, possibly hundreds of millions of dollars
were misdirected through disaster fraud to those unaffected by the
Hurricane (Kutz, 2006).
Another present day parallel to the Spanish Administration’s loan
program is the State of Louisiana’s Road Home program. The goal of this
program is to help everyone displaced because of Hurricane Katrina either
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come home, or stay where they are – whichever they choose. The funding
for this program is from a Congressional Appropriation of seven and a half
billion dollars that is earmarked for assisting homeowners recover from
uninsured losses. The Road Home so far is promising to be a rough one.
The State originally estimated that 123,000 homeowners would qualify for
funding and that grants would be up to $150,000. In the first eight weeks
of the program’s existence, they report that approximately 33,000 people
have registered; of that “only 255 homeowners have been told how much
money they qualify for, an average of $41,582 apiece” (Krupa, 2006 a).
In response to the devastating conflagrations that consumed the
City, the Cabildo ordered that all structures be built of brick, rather than
the wood that was more common in the area. This order shaped the Vieux
Carré into what the “French Quarter” is known as today. A number of
responses to Hurricane Katrina have been implemented that will have a
lasting effect on what the City will look like as we move into the future.
During a Special Legislative Session of the Louisiana Legislature, the state
formally adopted the International Construction Codes, 2006 as the
official building code for the State of Louisiana. This enhanced regulation
was designed to bring buildings to a higher standard concerning
vulnerability to wind damage, and durability. This change will not likely
have the same type of impact as a policy-based shift in building materials
since these changes deal more with the function than the form of buildings.
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However, other changes in the subsequent months will have a greater
effect on the actual appearance of the City (LPJA, 2005).
As to not risk the loss of potential FEMA funding or enrollment in
the National Flood Insurance Program for the City and its residents, the
Council of the City of New Orleans passed Ordinance Number 22354
M.C.S. in August of 2006. This ordinance amended the city’s Base Flood
Elevation as determined by the National Flood Insurance Program. The
affected changes require that all homes in the City be a minimum of three
feet higher than the height of the curb in front of the house, or at the level
of the Advisory Base Flood Elevation, whichever is higher. This will have
an impact on both the recovery and the aesthetics of the community. It
should be noted that the ordinance does waive compliance for all districts
and buildings under the jurisdiction of any of the City’s historic
preservation agencies (City of New Orleans, 2006).
The requirements of this ordinance and the new flood maps apply
specifically to those structures with greater than fifty percent (50%)
damage. This would be considered ‘substantial damage’ which is defined
as “repairs costing more than 50 percent of the cost to completely rebuild
the home” (Thevenot, 2006). Those buildings with less than 50% damage
would not be required to adhere to the more stringent standards enacted in
the wake of Katrina, rather they would be allowed to remain at the Base
Flood Elevation in effect at the time of construction. For those structures
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build before the City enrolled in the National Flood Insurance Program in
1975, as long as the damage to the property was less than the 50%
threshold that has been set in place, the property would simply be
grandfathered into the program. Many questions remain about the future
insurability of properties with less than 50% damage from the hurricane; it
is possible that future purchasers of the property will be unable to get flood
insurance unless they agree to bring the property up to modern elevations
(Thevenot, 2006).
New Orleanians have actively been seeking to reduce damage
estimates to avoid the costly process of raising or razing their homes to
comply with these new standards. As residents approach the City to obtain
the proper rebuilding documentation, they are also appealing the initial
damage assessments of their properties. By reducing damages to less than
50% of replacement cost, the city is allowed to issue construction permits
and let homeowners proceed with rebuilding their lives. This is likely o be
a smart move on the part of the city in terms of rebuilding and
repopulating, but the effect of public safety and property protection may be
detrimental in the long term. The standards for granting appeals in many
cases is as simple as bringing in photographs and stating that only
‘moderate’ rather than ‘substantial’ work would be required. The City of
New Orleans and FEMA are at odds over the justifiability of this practice,
FEMA contends that by allowing residents to rebuild, the City will expose
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them to future flooding, while the City maintains that the flooding was
caused “by catastrophic - - and preventable - - failure of the flood
protection system, not because home elevations were too low” (Meitrodt,
2006 a).
The implementation of this ordinance will require creative solutions
if the architecture of New Orleans is to be maintained in the rebuilding of
the City. What seems likely to occur is that New Orleans will either find
itself with a city full of homes built over garages, or a drastic change in the
way that homes are being built. Older New Orleans architecture did
integrate flood protection in the form of being raised several feet off of the
ground to allow for the flooding that was common before the levee system
was built to protect the region. As levee protection came to be almost
certain, homes were beginning to be built slab-on-grade; this made
construction more timely and efficient, but does not allow for lifting to be
brought in compliance with the City’s new flood maps. While the
picturesque New Orleans of postcard fame seems to be protected from this
fate, many mid-twentieth century homes are being lost. These are
structures that were historic in their own rights, but the cost and level of
difficulty may be too high for some homeowners to accept.
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Table 5.2

Response & Recovery Comparisons
Fire

Flood
FEMA and the SBA have loan and grant
programs designed to aid in the rebuilding of
homes and businesses in the disaster areas.

Low interest loans were granted to victims of the
disasters to rebuild their homes and their lives Louisiana has created the Road Home program,
funded by a $7.5 billion Congressional
Appropriation to help Louisiana homeowners
rebuild or relocate.
In the 2005 Extraordinary Session of the
Louisiana Legislature, the International
Construction Codes, 2006 was adopted as the
baseline building code for the State of Louisiana.
In 1788, the Spanish officials encouraged
colonists to rebuild using brick and slate/tile
roofs rather than wood homes with thatch or
wood shingles. After the Fire of 1794, these
changes became mandatory.

The New Orleans City Council approved the
Advisory Base Flood Elevation maps as provided
by the National Flood Insurance Program.
These elevations require that all structures more
than 50% damaged be raised to either the base
flood elevation or three feet higher than the
adjacent curb – whichever is higher.

While the long term effects of Hurricane Katrina
are yet to be seen, there is sure to be some effect
on the City's footprint. New Orleans has been
losing population for decades, and this even has
enhanced that process.
The fires caused the City's footprint to enlarge,
this was driven both by the desire of people to
deconcentrate from the confines of the Vieux
It is likely that regardless of the long term
Carré and the influx of immigrants from Europe population size, the shape of the city will reflect
and the newly formed United States.
those areas that remained dry throughout the
events of Katrina. This means that areas such as
New Orleans East and Gentilly will be less
populated, while density increases along the
natural levee of the Mississippi River.

Significant Differences between 1788 and 2005
There are numerous differences between the situations faced by the
City of New Orleans of 1788 and 1794 and the City today. Factors such as
population growth and the perceived importance of the area will contribute
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to or detract from the ability of the city to rebound as it did in the wake of
the disasters of the eighteenth century.
It is troublesome to compare the overall climate surrounding the
rebuilding efforts across the centuries. In the late eighteenth century,
there was a period of significant growth in the region surrounding New
Orleans, as we have previously discussed. This growth led to the creation
of several Faubourgs surrounding the Vieux Carré. In 1788 and 1794, the
Vieux Carré was the only area impacted by the disasters, but it should be
noted that it was also the only settled area of what would become
metropolitan New Orleans.
When Hurricane Katrina roared ashore in 2005, The City of New
Orleans had been losing population on a consistent basis for in excess of 25
years. For example, the US Census Bureau estimates that the City lost
approximately 45,000 people between 2000 and 2005 (US Census, New
Orleans Fact Sheet). This negative growth will likely be a severe detriment
to the rebuilding efforts in the City of New Orleans.
For decades, the population of New Orleans has been in decline.
Failing public schools and climbing crime rates are two factors among
many driving people out of the City and into the suburbs of Jefferson and
St. Tammany Parishes. These areas on the outskirts of New Orleans were
seen as havens to the middle-class whites that fled the City. Social,
economic and racial segregation remained realities in New Orleans long
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after the Civil Rights era of the 1960’s, not in a governmentally ordained
fashion, but in practice. Although the City of New Orleans was more
integrated more than many American cities before Katrina, there remained
white neighborhoods, black neighborhoods and specific areas for the rich
and poor of all races. It is these aspects of New Orleans that should be
seriously addressed in the rebuilding of the City of New Orleans.
Just as Colonial New Orleans learned how to improve upon the past
in the wake of disaster, so must modern New Orleans. In the eighteenth
century, the city leaders mandated that homes be built in a fire-resistant
way, to prevent the recurrence of major disasters; in the twenty-first
century we must also look to what changes can be made to prevent
repeating the past.
With nearly a year having passed since Hurricane Katrina, the most
positive guess at the current population of New Orleans is approximately
250,000 (Russell, 2006). Prior to the Hurricane, the City population was
estimated to be just above 437,000, which means that even in the best of
estimations, nearly 200,000 people have chosen, or not been able to return
to the City after more than one year of exile (US Census; Russell).
It should also be noted that in the cases of the fires of 1788 and 1794,
the residents of the City were simply left vast numbers of homes destroyed,
not vast numbers of homes destroyed and a depopulated city. The full
population of the city was participating in the clean-up that followed each
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blaze, and the rebuilding of their city was a necessity to life. Tents were
distributed to account for the immediate needs of the population, but
homes were quickly rebuilt to provide a permanent residence. Hurricane
Katrina removed nearly 100% of the population of New Orleans, by either
voluntary or forced evacuation; regardless, there were no citizens present
for a month or more to force the immediate recovery of their communities.
In many circumstances, the residents have taken matters into their
own hands, and have led the rebuilding efforts in the City. This bottom-up
charge for rebuilding simply took much longer to get started than it did in
1788. For weeks, and in some cases months, the residents of severely
damaged communities were barred from returning to their neighborhoods,
leaving the government with the job of both coordinating and performing
the recovery tasks. In the environment that was present in Post-Katrina
New Orleans, the prevailing opinion was that the public would get in the
way of efforts to clean up the community. It is not being suggested that the
City erred in keeping citizens away from the dangers of the overwhelmingly
flooded metropolis, but simply that there is no one better qualified to clean
up a neighborhood than its residents.
In recent months, the long term recovery for communities has fallen
to neighborhood groups that feel their government has failed them. Now
that residents are back, they are looking for ways to revive their
neighborhoods, and bring back the community with which they were once
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so familiar. In 1788, the “planning” as we refer to it today was controlled
by the Colonial Government, the citizens were crucial to accomplishing the
actual rebuilding. Today, many neighborhoods have undertaken their own
planning efforts to ensure the continued viability of their communities.
Many proposals have been made for the city as a whole, but none have
been adopted.
As a part of the City’s Bring New Orleans Back Final Report the
Urban Planning Committee included a brief “Why Rebuild?” analysis. This
document somewhat overly simplified the reasons to consider rebuilding
New Orleans, but it remains an interesting item to note. The Committee
lists such things as historical and cultural value, petroleum and
petrochemical production, natural resources such as fisheries and game,
and the economic and production value of the Port of New Orleans
(BNOBC, 2)
More important than the reasons to rebuild is the necessity behind
such statements being included in a document that is supposed to provide
a foundation for the recovery of an American City. It is impossible to know
if these same debates were waged in 1788 or 1794, but given the historical
context that the disasters occurred in, it is highly unlikely.
The situation being faced by New Orleans today is far different from
what she endured two centuries ago. In the late eighteenth century, the
North American continent was still being settled, the United States of
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America was an upstart nation that challenged their European rule and was
beginning to expand its borders westward. Today, the United States is the
last remaining super-power and is defending its interests, influence and
borders in dramatically different ways.
New Orleans was established as a strategic location for the defense of
“the Mississippi River, all the land drained by the river, and all its
tributaries” as was claimed by René-Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle in
1682 for France (Eakin, 73). By 1788, the City of New Orleans was seventy
years old, and was had become a hub for transportation and trade along
the Mississippi River. The location, for commerce and defense was critical
to maintaining control over the River and the inland interests of the thenpossessors of the territory, Spain. Had the City been abandoned after
either of the catastrophic fires of the eighteenth century, the Spanish would
have essentially abdicated their claim to the territory, since there would no
longer be a practical way to exert control.
As we progress into the twenty-first century, the location of New
Orleans, or even the existence thereof, is not nearly as apparent to her
home nation as in 1788. The presence of a line of defense is not necessary
to ensure territorial possession and travel along the Mississippi River;
however, The Port of New Orleans remains a hub for commerce, America’s
natural resources travel from the North, and foreign goods from the South.
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Many throughout the nation have argued that the rebuilding of New
Orleans is no more than an exercise in futility, since such an event is likely
to happen again, maybe not next year, or the year after but at some point in
the future. Perhaps the multi-billion dollar investment that will be
required of the federal government would be better spent on using the
power of eminent domain to simply vacate the city, but only time will truly
tell. New Orleans does sit below sea-level, in its lowest parts up to fifteen
feet below sea level, and it is sinking. So, it could be said that the
government is throwing money into a bottomless pit that gets deeper every
day. This is not the first catastrophic event to have befallen this city, nor
will it be the last, but the answer does not lie in abandonment, but rather in
protection.
Table 5.3

Response & Recovery Contrasts
Fire

Flood
By relying on the state and federal government to
In the 1700’s, all assistance and decisions were provide this assistance, vital time was lost in both
providing help to those stranded at shelters and
local – there was no way for the City to have
those trapped throughout the city by rising
even asked for help in a timely fashion
floodwaters.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans was
losing population. This disaster is likely to
This disaster occurred at a time of rapid growth
enhance this loss. In August,2005 the
and expansion, allowing for the rapid recovery of
population was estimated at 437,000 residents,
devastated areas and growth into new ones.
in November, 2006 the population estimate is
~200,000.
In the late eighteenth century into the early
nineteenth, New Orleans, like all of America was
seeing rapid immigration from many areas,
especially Europe.

Since Hurricane Katrina, there has been a rapid
influx of Latin American workers into New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast. It is too soon to
determine if this population will remain in the
City, or if this is temporary growth spurred by
the availability of jobs in this market.
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Cultural and Social Differences
When the fires consumed the City of New Orleans in the eighteenth
century, the city was at a turning point in its social and cultural
development. After nearly a century of domination by France and Spain,
the population was becoming more diverse, and the cultural landscape was
being modified to reflect that diversity. In the late eighteenth century,
Louisiana saw an influx of population in the form of the Acadians, exiled
from Canada and resettling in the bayous of Louisiana. Towards the end of
the eighteenth century, the City saw its population grow as a result of the
migration of immigrants from around the world. Many free people of color
began to arrive from the Caribbean at the same time that Americans were
starting to settle the area around New Orleans as a strategic trading post.
Also immigrating in this era were those of European descent, such as
Germans and the Irish (Wall, 70-71).
As was previously discussed, for many years preceding Hurricane
Katrina, New Orleans was a city that was hemorrhaging population. Since
Katrina, however, the City has seen a new wave of immigration, nearly to
the scale of that seen in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the
four months immediately following Hurricane Katrina over 100,000
Hispanic people migrated to the Gulf Coast in pursuit of employment.
These migrant workers seem to hail from all parts of Latin America, with
many coming specifically from Mexico. So many in fact, that the Mexican
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government is exploring the possibility of reconstituting the now-dormant
Mexican consulate in New Orleans (Waller, 2006).
Immigrants from Latin American nations have come to New Orleans
seeking employment; these people – for better or for worse – are willing to
put in long hours for low pay. Most of the population that has found its
way to New Orleans is male, and it is believed that many may migrate out
of the City as work wanes and the City gets back on its feet. There should
be no doubt that at least a portion of this population will remain in New
Orleans, and start a new chapter in her urban development.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, American and
European immigration forever changed the way New Orleans looked and
behaved. As the Americans came from the north to utilize the Mississippi
as a trade route, they began settling to take advantage of the relative
closeness to the mouth of the river and the natural deepwater port that was
New Orleans. German and Irish immigrants made their way to the City
around the same time that they began flowing into other sections of North
America.
The Germans and Irish “formed the city’s white lower classes”
(Lewis, 45) and were the primary original inhabitants of the Faubourg
Marigny. This settlement pattern had more to do with the separation of
cultures than anything else, the Creole population of New Orleans, residing
in the Vieux Carré, wanted nothing to do with these newly arrived people,
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nor did the immigrants want anything to do with the existing population.
The language division certainly exacerbated the divide between the
inhabitants and immigrants, and this same divisive settlement pattern
progresses still today. In the mid-twentieth century, New Orleans saw an
influx of Vietnamese immigrants; this group still exists in cultural enclaves
around the metropolitan area, the most predominant of which are the
Versailles and Village de L’est subdivisions in New Orleans East, an area
heavily damaged by Katrina’s floodwaters. This group has not only
remained closely bound over as much as three generations, but has become
a force in post-Katrina politics, and a model of cooperative community
rebuilding.
It is too soon to determine if the next wave of New Orleans
immigrants will follow this same pattern. The difference in this situation is
that this group moved to the city en masse, and has found housing
wherever it was available. However, this housing is generally highly priced
and rental, meaning that as the newly arrived Hispanic immigrants to New
Orleans make the decision to commit to the City, there may be a growing
trend of Spanish-speaking people forming communities in redeveloping
areas. With the scale of devastation in areas like New Orleans East and the
Lower Ninth Ward, there is no way to guess conclusively who will reside in
these areas in the coming years, and how they will be reshaped. Although
both suffered severe damage, the Lakeview and Gentilly communities seem
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to have a higher rate of return than is being seen in the other heavily
damaged areas of the City. Residents in these areas are more likely not
only to have had insurance, but also to have had adequate insurance to
return their homes to pre-disaster conditions.
Disaster has a way of changing both form and function in a
community. Prior to the disastrous fires, most buildings in the City were
made of wood. After these disasters, the Cabildo created a fire code to
prevent large scale disasters from again consuming the community.
Structures changed from wood to brick construction, with roofing of slate
rather than wood or thatch. This was seen as a key measure in protecting
the citizens and the Royal investment in rebuilding. Another measure that
was seen as crucial to the lasting survival of eighteenth century New
Orleans was the deconcentration of the Vieux Carré. In the wake of the
first fire, the Faubourg Ste. Marie was created just upriver from the old
city, and after the second fire the Faubourg Marigny was established
downriver.
As New Orleans moves on from the devastation of Hurricane
Katrina, we are seeing significant shifting in how we recreate the built
environment of the community to reflect the lessons and needs of the
twenty-first century. For years, New Orleans has relied on the flood
protection system that was supposed to protect it from becoming an
American Venice. This assumption was physically demonstrated in the
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shift from the raised construction of the earlier centuries to the slab-ongrade construction of the mid-twentieth century. Slab homes were as
much a product of rapid suburbanization as pre-fabricated construction.
While not debating the concept of slab-on-grade and pre-fabricated
construction methods, these may not have been the best path to follow in
the New Orleans area. Earlier building styles incorporated open areas
under homes to allow for flooding in the unpredictable environment of
New Orleans. Whether this was accomplished by using pilings or brick
‘chain-walls’ the result was in keeping homes safe from the street flooding
that was common before pumping systems and outfall canals became the
norm.
As New Orleans is reconstructed, older homes are being raised to
prevent repetitive loss by flood even if not required to do so by the newly
enacted flood standards. There is ongoing debate nationally and locally
regarding the action and policy decisions being made in the reconstruction
of New Orleans. To the City’s defense, it is hard to make policies to
adequately protect citizens when those above are controlling the resources.
The devastation was caused by a failure of the federally-funded hurricane
protection levees, not the storm itself; and until a decision is made from
Washington, D.C. regarding the future of hurricane protection in New
Orleans, local leaders are left to making best-guess decisions on what fate
the future may hold.
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New architecture, while reflective of the unique style of New Orleans,
is being designed with flood-loss control in mind. How New Orleans will
look in ten years is open to debate. Many people want to retain the
appearance of New Orleans architecture as the city reconstitutes itself, but
others want to see more innovative design options made available in the
community. Immediate housing is necessary to spur the redevelopment of
communities, and people cannot be expected to live in their FEMAprovided travel-trailers until permanent housing can be found. Factorybuilt modular housing has become one option on the rebuilding
smorgasbord. These homes are being designed to both be elevated and be
complementary to more traditional forms of New Orleans architecture.
Many residents are weighing their rebuilding options. Modular homes are
being offered at lower prices and in much less time than traditionally built
homes, but the sacrifice is in having a standardized design, both internally
and externally (Meitrodt, 2006 b).
New Orleans has a history, and a certain aura that surrounds her
neighborhoods. This atmosphere is created as much by the physical as the
human characteristics of individual communities. There seems to be a
preoccupation in New Orleans with trying to put everything back to where
it was on August 28, 2005, without addressing the reality of what occurred
on August 29. New Orleans is a different city, and this reality needs to be
recognized and embraced; however, the residents of New Orleans need not
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let the rushing floodwaters wash away that which makes the community
unique. Not only has debate circulated around the architectural future of
New Orleans, but on the function of that architecture as well.
The city in its original, organic form was reflective of what has
become known as “new urbanism.” Over the years New Orleans, like other
cities, adopted the suburban, car-dependent model of development. Many
would like to see New Orleans return to its original shape, rather than
rebuilding the stretches of suburbia were indicative of development in the
Post World War II era around New Orleans. This shift in form would
coincide with the shift in functionality and architectural styling. In many
areas across the Gulf Coast, including New Orleans, self-proclaimed “urban
designers” have tried to recreate the ambiance of Magazine Street but with
the promises of retailers like the The Gap and Williams-Sonoma
populating these storefronts instead of neighborhood pizzerias and used
record shops. While the ideas of mixed use corridors serve the functions of
bringing more people to higher grounds and increasing walkability these
changes will, in many places, cause the urban fabric of the City to be
compromised in a more serious way than the storm that brought them
about (MacCash, 2005).
Architecturally, the city needs to look to find a modern compromise
of blending the past and the present. Much ado has been made about the
need to build sustainable, green communities to bring us into the future.
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Such recommendations have based their suggestions on how communities
survived in the past. With the technological innovations of the past
century, we have surrendered the knowledge of how to live without airconditioning and the other amenities of daily life in 2006. High ceilings
and double-hung windows were a staple of New Orleans and Caribbean
architecture in the past, these two particular features allowed buildings to
remain at a comfortable temperature during even the most intense of
summer days. The compromise that must be made would particularly
involve maintaining the features of the past that can help us weather
another storm, while not making the City of New Orleans look like it’s an
extension of Disneyland. The difference between true New Orleans
architecture and mass produced variations on it are noticeable to anyone
who has come across some recent New Orleans developments.
The footprint of the city has been a hot-button issue since the Urban
Land Institute (ULI) made the infamous “shrinking footprint”
recommendation to the Bring New Orleans Back Commission in November
of 2005. In this report, ULI recommended that the redevelopment of New
Orleans be focused on the natural levees along the Mississippi River and
other naturally higher ground in the City. This proposal left vast tracts of
green space throughout the City to serve as floodplain area as well as
parkland. While this may have been a rationalized approach to the
rebuilding of a devastated community, this proposal allowed for no

66

consideration for the property owners whose houses were slated to be
parkland (Urban Land Institute, 2005).
As the city approached the year 1800, fire had consumed most of the
original city of New Orleans and how these disasters physically shaped the
city became clearer with every passing day. The boundaries of New
Orleans were expanding, not only to meet the needs of the growing
immigrant population, but because the concentration of the Vieux Carré
was seen as risk factor in the prevention of another sweeping conflagration.
While the suggestion is not being made that concentrating the city
will prevent catastrophic flooding, what is being suggested is that future
development will likely be in those areas located on the natural levee of the
Mississippi, which received no flooding during Hurricane Katrina. Figure
5.3 (page 67) illustrates the area where future development is primarily
being encouraged. Local leadership is encouraging people to rebuild and
repopulate all areas of the city, including those areas east of the Industrial
Canal. From the rebuilding proposals that have been drafted for the City,
the naturally higher ground near the Mississippi River provides at least a
sense of safety from floods that may be lacking in other parts of the
community.
The City of New Orleans has taken the position of letting the market drive
what areas will be revived. By allowing the market to drive the where the
city places its limited resources, people are given a greater opportunity to
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determine where they want to resettle, be that in their formerly flooded
neighborhoods or on the higher ground of the levee. This policy could
result in favoring those areas with the economic ability to rebuild en masse,
leaving those in areas with lower rates of return with sub-standard city
services. Over the course of the fifteen months since Hurricane Katrina’s
wrath struck the City, officials have been unable, or unwilling to make
decisions regarding the future of specific areas. The result of the Unified
New Orleans Plan, which is slated to be a city-wide compilation of
neighborhood plans, is expected by the early part of 2007, if adopted this
plan will allow residents to make an informed decision about the future of
their own communities, and will aid the City in deciding where to place
resources.
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Figure 5.3: 1878 New Orleans footprint versus 2005 flood depths.

Source: The Times-Picayunne, November 3, 2005
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Chapter VI
Conclusion
What Can History Teach Us?
There are numerous lessons that should be learned from the past
experiences of New Orleans. The history of disaster recovery in general
would not help this city in the same way that the history of New Orleans
can guide the direction that the City should take from this point. New
Orleans is a unique, organic community in that it started off as a small
French settlement in 1718 in the most unlikely and unwelcoming of
locations and grew to encompass the history and traditions of people from
around the world that have made their way there. Even in the melting pot
that is America, New Orleans has maintained its own personality. As a
community, New Orleans has not adopted the generalized mainstream
traditions and celebrations that are found throughout the vast nation of
which it is a part, but rather it has retained its own ideas and forced those
entering to accept the New Orleans way rather than bending to the ways of
the outside.
Through the years New Orleans has been required to fall in line with
outside forces, but even compliance with these policies New Orleans has
done it her own way. In the late eighteenth century the Spanish
Administration required that traditional New Orleans building style of
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wood be abandoned and brick used in its place; in response New Orleans
absorbed these Spanish building styles and made them its own. It is
doubtless that a similar process will be repeated in the twenty-first century;
the new building codes and flood elevations will also likely be amalgamated
into the unique fabric that is New Orleans. The disasters of 1788 and 1794
were substantially different from that of 2005, but in many ways the same.
Both relocated large portions of the population; both, by their very nature,
have left deep scars in the social and cultural fabric of the community; and
both have affected the course of future events of a Great American City.
Disasters force change that is a fact that cannot be escaped
regardless of the uniqueness of a community. What the uniqueness does
aid in is how gracefully that community can pick itself up and look to the
future with its head high. New Orleans is just such a place. The disastrous
events of two hundred years ago may exist on the margins of history, but
remembering their lessons would benefit us today. There are numerous
factors that guide the direction in which a city is moving at any given time,
but rarely do those factors converge into one historical turning point.
March 21, 1788 and August 29, 2005 were certainly two of those rare
occasions.
Life has become far more complicated in the interim two centuries
between the disasters, but certain truths hold true. We have seen that over
the centuries, a government’s responsibility to its citizens has stayed
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relatively constant. Food and shelter for victims of disaster is, and should
be, a top priority; but the true government impact comes as the community
begins to rebuild. The first action taken is to attempt to prevent a
reoccurrence of the event. In 1788 this included the creation of building
codes to require brick rather than wood construction, and in 2006 the
raising houses to comply with redrawn Base Flood Elevation maps, the
construction of flood-gates and improved pumping systems, and more
stringent building codes.
Following mitigation measures set in place by the government, and
agencies such as FEMA and the National Flood Insurance Program, the
community must now come together and determine collectively where they
would like to be in the future; the most critical element that must be
present is the determination to restore their community; not specifically
the physical aspect, but the social and cultural ones.
No one knows how New Orleans will recover from Katrina, but what
is sure is that she will. The footprint may be larger or smaller,
Tchoupitoulas may be pronounced with more if a Spanish accent, and
perhaps Calliope will be pronounced more like the steam-instrument than
a hybrid melon. What is certain about the future of this great, iconic city is
that there are brighter days ahead, and that by learning from past events
we will not have to endure those hardships again. There will always be
hurricanes, but there are also still fires; the key is knowing how to
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minimize the effect of the disaster. Through exploring the past, we can
learn the value of ancestral knowledge and how to overcome adversity be it
in the form of Fire or Flood.
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